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The observability of information, the principal-agent relationship and the optimal 
contract are essential components of the Economics of information, which can be 
employed to describe the game-playing between two participators. However, there are 
unknown field covering the tansaction of commodities in real economy, which based 
on the supply chain. This paper is supposed to provide original study on the 
Continuous Principal-Agent on which supply chain runs. Furthermore, the agriculrtue 
products are described as physical and information flow, as a result, this paper gives 
suggestions about optimizing circulation of commodities. 
This paper consists of 4 chapters. Chapter I introduces the background and 
literature review. Beginning with recent development of Chinese agriculture, this 
paper brings forward different arguments from mainstream theory. Grounded on the 
reviews of theories about asymmetric information and agriculture products circulation, 
this paper provides a new possibility to resolve problems in our country, meanwhile, 
this paper sets out three directions: the information attribution of commodity, the 
participator of transaction and the supply chain. 
Chapter II gives an overall summary of Principal-Agent theory, and then presents 
its basic concepts, formula and conclusions briefly. Chapter III makes emphasis on the 
innovation of analysis method. Different from traditional theory containing only two 
participators, this paper gives rise to Continuous Principal-Agent for the first time, 
which constructs a new model named Principal-Agent Chain to describes supply chain. 
A principal-agent chain is divided into 4 types; they are symmetric information, 
hemi-symmetric information, hemi-asymmetric information and complete asymmetric 
information. Furthermore, this paper puts up with several ways to different types 
above, which formed a theorical solution to asymmetric information in supply chain. 
Chapter IV tries to describes supply chain as Principal-Agent Chain Model. At 
the first stage, the supply chain is interpreted as sequential traditional Principal-Agent 
knobs involved two participators. At the second stage, the physical nonstandardization 
of comodity and the intensity of asymmetric information are introduced into a 
furthermore analysis on pork, a commodity with natural great intensity of asymmetric 














participators and 4 transactions. By the way, some external variables, such as 
regulations of government and industrialization of agriculture, are also introduced to 
draw a conclusion of optimized contracts. 
Chapter V attempts to correct asymmetric information in supply chain. By means 
of Continuous Principal-Agent, adverse selection in supply chain is brought forth with 
the validity of sorts of solution. Consequently, it is not feasible that the argument from 
mainstream academics insists on establishing an exchange markets national wide, 
though it’s the best project theoretically, on the contrary, it is more practical to create a 
second optimal solution under the circumstance of our country. In the end , this paper 
takes two measures to correct part of asymmetric information and realize second 
optimal markets. They are: 
(1) to set up a dual market making use of the Separate Equilibrium; 
(2) to reach a second optimal market by adjusting participators or using buffering 
pool. 
Chapter VI summarizes principal conclusions overall, at the same time, respects 
insufficiencies of study. The further research is also mentioned in the end. 
The original contribution of the study comprises five aspects. Academically, this 
paper, for the first time, gives a brand new concept of Continuous Principal-Agent, 
which help to extend traditional theory to a new field with more than two participators, 
meanwhile, extend traditional optimal contract to a set of optimal contracts. 
Practically, this paper finds an economic explanation to supply chain, as 
principal-agent chain, which causes an adverse selection in supply chain. 
Consequently this paper affirms a new application to improve supply chain, which 
enlarge policy-making. Especially, the paper introduces some solution aiming at pork 
circulation, which can be used in other commodities. 
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